Introduction
This chapter analyses the effects of changes in tax structures (the ways in which different tax instruments are designed and combined to generate revenues) on the performance of firms, and thus on the level and growth of GDP per capita. It draws on the results of a recent OECD study on tax and economic growth, described in Johansson et al (2008) . 2 As practical tax policy has many objectives, the results presented here do not constitute policy recommendations, as the singleminded pursuit of GDP growth could compromise other policy objectives. In particular, the paper draws attention to a number of instances in which there is a trade-off between growth and equity. 1 Focusing on tax structures rather than levels (as measured, for example, by the overall tax-to-GDP ratio) is desirable because cross-country differences in tax levels largely reflect societal choices as to the appropriate level of public spending, an issue that is beyond the scope of tax policy analysis. In addition, the focus on tax structures allows a consideration of revenue-neutral tax policy changes, and thus avoids the difficulty of taking account of how any changes in aggregate revenue might be reflected in changes in public expenditure. The importance of this second point can be seen by comparing (i) a tax revenue increase that finances increased infrastructure investment with (ii) a similar increase to finance increased social benefits. Policy (i) can be expected to have a better growth outcome than policy (ii), and therefore neither policy could be said to represent the effect of tax revenue on economic growth.
In practice, it is difficult to distinguish between the effects of tax policy on levels and on growth rates of GDP. Indeed, any policy that raises the level of GDP will increase the growth rate of GDP because changes in GDP levels take time. Also, transitional growth may be long-lasting, and so it has not proved possible to distinguish effects on long-run growth from transitional growth effects, although some elements of the tax system are likely to influence long-run growth.
For instance, it is possible that tax changes that encourage innovation and entrepreneurship may have persistent long-run growth effects, while those that affect investment also can have longlasting effects on growth that fade out in the long-run. In contrast, tax changes affecting labour supply will have only a transitory effect on growth. This chapter looks at consequences of taxes for both GDP per capita levels and their transitional growth rates but concentrates on the effects of taxation on the behaviour of firms in terms of investment and total factor productivity growth, as these are the most likely to produce long-term changes in growth rates. Despite this focus on firm behaviour, both the macroeconomic results in section 2 and the policy discussion in section 4 also reflect household responses to taxation in the form of labour supply and savings decisions.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reports on the effects of changes in the tax mix between major categories of taxes at the macroeconomic level, showing that income taxes are more harmful to growth than consumption or property taxes. In view of these results, section 3 examines the effects of both corporate and personal income taxes on investment and productivity growth, at both the industry level and the firm level. Section 4 discusses the policy implications from these results, and section 5 provides a brief conclusion.
The overall tax mix
All OECD countries rely on a mix of taxes on consumption, property, personal income (defined in this chapter to include employee and employer social security contributions and payroll taxes) and corporate income. Setting the right mix is important, because the growth effects of collecting revenue from different sources can be very different. For example, Kneller et al (1999) find that taxes on income have a negative effect on growth while taxes on consumption have no effect.
In order to analyse the effect of the tax mix in detail and over as long a period as possible, estimates at the macro level were obtained by introducing a set of tax structure indicators into a panel regression of GDP per capita covering 21 OECD countries over the period 1970 to 2005
(for details see Arnold, 2008) . The setup also takes into account the fact that more use of a given tax instrument reduces the amount of revenues that need to be raised from other taxes, when considering revenue-neutral tax changes. This is achieved by always omitting one element of the tax mix in each regression (indicated in the bottom line of table 1) and this component is assumed to be absorbing changes in the other taxes that are included in the regression, to maintain revenue neutrality.
The interpretation of the results needs to take account of three important aspects of the estimation procedure. First, the estimated equation does not simply look across countries and examine whether those with one sort of tax mix have higher GDP than others, which carries the risk of mistakenly attributing some of the differences between countries to taxes when they are really caused by something else. Instead, it is looking at changes in these variables and examining how each country"s GDP changes when its tax mix changes. This minimises the risks associated with simple cross-country analysis and has the added advantage of capturing the effect that is of interest to policy makers: how will GDP respond if they change the tax mix? Second, as the estimates are based on the changes in the tax mix that have been observed in OECD countries, they show the effects of fairly modest changes in the tax mix and do not necessarily apply to more substantial changes. Finally, to aid the interpretation of the results, they are presented in terms of their effects on the long-run level of GDP, making the conservative assumption that tax mix changes do not alter the long-run growth rate of GDP. As mentioned in the introduction, there are not sufficient data available to test whether this assumption is correct. 1. In the estimated model, y refers to output per capita, s k to the investment rate into physical capital, h to human capital, n to the population growth rate, respectively. The vector V contains a set of policy variables. All equations include short-run dynamics, country-specific intercepts and country-specific time controls. Standard errors are in brackets. *: significant at 10 % level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1 % level. Table 1 reports the long-run effects of various revenue neutral tax shifts, based on the estimated dynamic equation, which also includes other basic growth determinants from a "baseline model" as well as the overall tax burden as a control variable.
3 Column 1 shows a negative coefficient on the share of (personal and corporate) income taxes, indicating that an increase in the share of these taxes that is balanced by an decreased share of consumption and property taxes will reduce long-run GDP per capita and thus reduce growth. Column 2 looks at the different effects personal and corporate taxes and shows that an increase in corporate income taxes (financed by an increase in consumption and property taxes) has a stronger negative effect on GDP per capita than a similar increase in personal income taxation.
Columns 3 to 5 report on a shift in the opposite direction: increasing consumption and property taxes while reducing income taxes. Column 3 shows a positive effect that is similarly-sized to the negative effect reported in column 1. Results reported in column 4 break up the effect of an increase in consumption and property taxes, allowing a reduction in income taxation. In summary, these results suggest a "tax and growth ranking" with recurrent taxes on immovable property being the least harmful (or most beneficial) tax instrument in terms of its effect on long-run GDP per capita, followed by consumption taxes (and other property taxes), personal income taxes and corporate income taxes. An idea of the possible magnitude of these differences is given by the estimates of the effect on GDP per capita of a shift of 1% of tax revenues from income taxes to consumption and property taxes. These suggest that such a 3 This control variable is used to remove the bias that could result from a correlation between the tax mix and the overall tax burden. However, the value of the coefficient on this variable does not represent an accurate estimate of the effect of the overall tax burden on GDP because, as discussed in the introduction, it takes no account of how any additional tax revenue might be spent.
revenue-neutral shift would increase GDP per capita by between a quarter of a percentage point and one percentage point in the long run depending on the empirical specification.
3.
The effects of personal and corporate income taxes on firm performance
Personal income taxes
This chapter includes social security contributions and payroll taxes in its definition of personal income taxes, and these taxes can affect the relative price of capital and labour and so could lead to a reallocation of inputs within and between firms and/or industries that could have transitional growth effects. For instance, a change in the relative factor price could lead to less usage of one or more of the production inputs in a firm and/or industry. It is possible that all inputs not used in this firm/industry are either re-allocated to other less productive firms/industries or not used at all, thereby lowering the efficiency in the use of production inputs, i.e. total factor productivity (TFP) growth.
It is also possible that labour taxes influence foreign direct investment adversely by increasing labour cost in the host country. For instance, Hajkova et al. (2006) found that the impact on FDI of labour taxes is generally substantially larger than that of cross-border effective corporate tax rates. 4 This can hinder technology transfers and spill-overs of best practices from multinationals to domestic firms, thereby reducing TFP.
Also, top marginal income tax rates have a theoretically ambiguous impact on TFP via entrepreneurship by affecting risk taking by individuals. On the one hand, high taxes reduce the post-tax income of a successful entrepreneur relative to an unsuccessful one and can reduce entrepreneurial activity and TFP growth. On the other hand, high tax rates provide for increased risk-sharing with the government if potential losses can be written off against other income, which may encourage entrepreneurial activity (Myles, 2007) . However, Gentry and Hubbard (2000) suggests that the higher is the difference between the marginal tax rates when successful and unsuccessful (a measure of tax progressivity) the lower is risk-taking as the extra tax that applies 4
The effect on FDI of a one standard deviation change in the tax wedge on labour income is around ten times larger than the effect of a similar change in the marginal and average cross-border effective tax rate.
to high profits is greater than the tax saving that is produced by losses, effectively reducing the strength of the risk-sharing effect.
Estimating the effect of taxation on TFP based on industry-level data is difficult as available tax indicators are not differentiated by industries, although their impact may vary across industries. As discussed in Vartia (2008) , an indirect way to test for these tax effects is to identify industry-specific characteristics relevant for different tax policies and examines the interaction between these characteristics and the appropriate taxes. For example, the estimation assumes that one industry characteristic that affects the sensitivity of TFP to social security contributions is labour intensity. If the results of the econometric analysis support the hypothesis that the negative impact of taxes on TFP is stronger in certain industries due to these salient characteristics, then the estimated coefficient of the interaction term should be negative whereas if tax incentives have a stronger positive effect on TFP in industries with certain characteristics, the coefficient should be positive. One important caveat to this approach is that the estimated effect only captures the effect of a tax that is related to industry characteristics. Any direct effect of the tax on TFP (unrelated to the industry characteristics) is captured in the fixed effects. TFP at the industry-level is calculated as the "Solow-residual" from a production function where the factor shares in the production function are proxied by the cost shares in value-added.
The empirical results draw on a specification that captures two empirical regularities, namely technological catch-up with the leading firms/industries and persistence of TFP levels over time (Scarpetta and Tressel, 2002; Griffith et al. 2006) . The same empirical approach is used in assessing the effects of corporate taxes on TFP (below).
The main empirical results of the effect of personal income taxes on TFP are shown in table 2.
As suggested above, it seems reasonable to assume that the impact of social security contributions (SSCs) on firms" behaviour should depend on their labour intensity. Thus, column 1 reports on the effect of introducing an interaction term between labour intensity and social security contribution.
The coefficient on this term is negative and significant at the 5% level, indicating that SSCs have a negative influence on TFP and that this effect is larger in labour intensive industries. Column 2 shows a similar result when only employer"s SSCs are considered. However, the magnitude of the effect of SSC on the long-run level of TFP is estimated to be relatively small. 
In the estimated empirical model
refer respectively to (i) TFP growth in a country i, industry j and year t; (ii) TFP growth in an industry in the best practice country; (iii) the relative difference between TFP in an industry and in that industry in the best practice country; (iv) a human capital measure; (v) the interaction term between industry characteristics and the relevant tax; (vi) other policy variables and (vii) fixed effects. The level of TFP is measured as the "Solow-residual" from a production function. The anti-competitive regulation impact is an industry-specific measure of the degree to which each industry in the economy is exposed to anti-competitive regulation in non-manufacturing sectors. In Column (4) the coefficients of the interaction term between social security contributions and labour intensity are distinguished by the degree of administrative extension of collective wage agreements. In Columns (1)- (2) and (4) the interaction term between job turnover and employment protection legislation is dropped as there may be some collinearity problems related to job turnover and labour intensity. The estimation sample includes 13 OECD countries and 21 industries over the 1981-2001 period. The results are robust to introducing other interaction terms with other tax variables. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. * denotes significance at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%
When considering the effects of top marginal income tax rates on TFP growth, it is reasonable to suppose that any effect will be stronger in industries with a high rate of new firm entry. This is partly because new firms are more risky and partly because new firms are more likely to be either unincorporated or closely held corporations, and so more likely to take account of the personal tax treatment of profits than is a publicly traded corporation. The results in column 3 support this supposition by showing that top marginal personal income tax rates have a more negative effect on TFP in industries characterised by high firm entry rates.
In order to obtain an approximate idea of the implications of this result for long-run growth, a simulation experiment was conducted and indicated that the effect of a reduction of the top marginal tax rate from 55% to 50% on the average yearly TFP growth rate (over 10 years) would be 0.05 percentage points larger for industries with the median firm entry rate than for industries with the lowest level of firm entry. Under the assumption that the effect of top marginal rates are close to zero in industries with the lowest level of firm entry (i.e. that the top marginal rate has no direct effect, unrelated to the rate of firm entry), this may be interpreted as a median effect. The effect of this tax reduction on TFP depends on the industry structure and this tax cut would increase the average annual productivity growth rate by 0.06 percentage points more in an industry at the 75th percentile of firm entry than in an industry at the 25th percentile of the distribution of firm entry.
Column 4 shows weak evidence that the negative effect of SSC tends to be stronger in countries with a sizeable administrative extension of collective wage agreements to non-unionised firms. The extension of wage agreements may magnify the effects of SSC increases on labour cost
by making it more difficult to shift the burden of this increase on workers" wages and more so in industries that are more labour-intensive.
Corporate income taxes
Corporate taxes can be expected to reduce investment by firms as they increase the user cost of capital. In addition, they can be expected to reduce TFP growth for a number of reasons. First, as with labour taxes, corporate taxes can distort relative factor prices resulting in a re-allocation of resources towards possibly less productive sectors (e.g. the non-corporate sector) which may lower total factor productivity (Boersch-Supan, 1998). Second, complex corporate tax codes can cause high tax compliance costs for firms and high administrative burdens for governments, which absorb resources that could be used for productive activities, causing productivity and efficiency losses. Third, high corporate taxes may reduce incentives to invest in innovative activities by reducing their after-tax return. Fourth, to the extent that corporate taxes reduce FDI and the presence of foreign multinational enterprises they can hinder technology transfers and knowledge spill-overs to domestic firms.
In order to test the impact on investment and TFP, empirical evidence was obtained from both firm-level data covering a sample of 14 European OECD countries and industry-level data covering 21 industries in 16 OECD countries.
Investment
The empirical results, both at firm and industry level, assessing the effect of taxes on investment were obtained by introducing the tax adjusted user cost in a standard investment equation with adjustment costs of capital (see Schwellnus and Arnold, 2008 and Vartia, 2008 for details) . In addition to the standard user cost components (the required rate of return to the investment, the economic depreciation rate and anticipated capital gain/loss due to a change in before-tax price of the asset) the tax-adjusted user cost takes into account taxes on profits and the present value of the tax savings from depreciation allowances. The industry-specific user cost is constructed as a weighted average of the asset specific user cost where the weights are the share of each asset in total industry investment.
The main empirical findings at the firm-level are summarised in Table 3 (see Schwellnus and Arnold, 2008 for details). Column 1 shows that increases in the tax-adjusted user cost of capital are found to reduce investment at the firm-level, while column 2 shows that this effect is larger for more profitable firms. A simulation experiment suggests that a reduction of the statutory corporate tax rate from 35% to 30% reduces the user cost by approximately 2.8%. Applying the estimated long-run tax adjusted user cost elasticity (from column 1), this implies a long-run increase of the investment-to-capital ratio of approximately 1.9%. the lag of the tax adjusted user cost and (vii) γ s and γ ct sector and countryyear fixed effects, respectively. The estimation sample contains 12 European OECD countries and only observations with investment ratios beween 0 and 1. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the countrysector level in parentheses. * denotes significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%
The main results obtained at the industry-level are summarised in Table 4 , (see Vartia, 2008 for details). Columns 1 and 2 report the results of using two different estimation techniques.
Investment is clearly negatively affected by increases in corporate taxation but the long-run user cost elasticity is estimated to vary between -0.4 and -1, depending on the empirical specification.
A simulation experiment indicates that a cut in the statutory corporate tax rate from 35% to 30% 13 would increase the long-run investment-to-capital ratio by 1.0% or 2.6%, depending on the specification. These two estimates at the industry level lay either side of the firm-level estimate. 
In the estimated empirical model (I/K) i,j,t , UCtax i,j,t-1 , DlnY i,j,t-1 and PMR i,j,t-1 refer respectively to (i) investment-to-capital ratio in country i, industry j and year t;
(ii) the tax adjusted user cost; (iii) the relative change in value added and (iv) the impact of anti-competitive regulation. The anti-competitive regulation impact is an industry-specific measure of the degree to which each industry in the economy is exposed to anti-competitive regulation in non-manufacturing sectors. The long run elasticity is computed as β 2 /(1-β 1 ). The effects are similar when a non-log version of the investment equation is estimated. The estimation sample includes 16 OECD countries and 21 industries for period 1983-2001. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. * denotes significance at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
Column 3 shows that the size of the negative tax effect on investment appears to be similar for small and large firms (measured by the number of employees). In contrast, older firms" investment appears to be more negatively affected by increases in the tax-adjusted user cost than small firms, to the extent that it is only the effect on older firms that is statistically significant. One possible explanation is that young firms are generally less profitable than older firms and therefore less affected by corporate taxation. The other explanation may be that among young firms there is a disproportionately high share of small firms that benefit from exemptions or reduced rates.
Productivity
Turning to the empirical findings for TFP, the approach was based on identifying industryspecific characteristics that are expected to cause a differential effect of corporate taxes on industry TFP in the same way as in the analysis of personal income taxes (above). On particular, the estimation approach (both at firm and industry-level) assumes that corporate taxes affect TFP more in firms and industries with higher profitability. Also, to assess the effect of tax incentives for R&D expenditures on TFP, it is assumed that the effect is greater in industries with higher R&D intensity. As with the results in table 2, related to the effect of income taxes on TFP, a simulation experiment was carried out using the results shown in column 1 of table 5. This suggests that the effect of a reduction of the corporate tax rate from 35% to 30% on the average yearly TFP growth rate (over 10 years) would be 0.4 percentage points higher for firms in industries with median profitability than for firms in industries with the lowest level of profitability. Under the assumption that the effects of corporate taxation are close to zero for firms with the lowest tax base (i.e. assuming that there is no direct effect of the tax, independently of firm profitability), this may be interpreted as a median effect. The effect of this tax cut on TFP depends on the industry structure and this reduction would increase the average annual productivity growth rate by 0.4 percentage points more in an industry at the 75th percentile of profitability than in an industry at the 25th percentile of profitability.
Column 2 shows that the negative effect of corporate taxes is uniform across firms of different size and age classes, except for firms that are both small and young (where the effect is smaller and statistically insignificant). This may be due to some countries" exemptions or reduced rates targeted at start-up firms, which would reduce the amount of their corporate tax payments. [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . TFP is the residual of a Cobb-Douglas production function estimated at the country-sector level. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the countrysector level in parentheses. * denotes significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%
Column 3 shows that rising firms that are in the process of catching up with the technological frontier are particularly affected by corporate taxes. This could be because such firms rely heavily on retained earnings to finance their growth. Even in sectors with low average profitability there is a subset of highly profitable firms that catch up with the technological frontier. Table 6 reports the main empirical results obtained at the industry-level, again using the main statutory corporate tax rate as the measure of corporate taxation (see Vartia, 2008 for details).
Column 1 shows that lowering corporate taxes is estimated to boost TFP in profitable industries.
A similar simulation experiment to that carried out on the results presented in table 5 suggests that the effect (over 10 years) of a reduction of the corporate tax rate from 35% to 30% on the average yearly TFP growth rate would be 0.08 percentage points higher for industries with the median profitability than for an industry with the lowest level of profitability. As mentioned above, this may be interpreted as a median effect if one is prepared to assume that there is no direct effect of the tax (independent of profitability). The effect of this tax cut on TFP depends on the industry structure and this reduction would increase the average annual productivity growth rate by 0.08 percentage points more in an industry at the 75 th percentile of profitability than in an industry at the 25 th percentile of profitability. This estimate is considerably smaller than that obtained by the analysis of firm level data.
Column 2 reports the effect of tax incentives for R&D spending, which is obtained by using the B-index (which measures the minimum value of before-tax income that a firm needs to cover the cost of R&D investment where the cost is standardised to one dollar). R&D tax incentives are measured as one minus the B-index as a proxy of the generosity of R&D tax incentives. This shows that R&D tax incentives are estimated to raise TFP and that this effect is larger in R&D intensive industries. However, the average effect of tax incentives on the level of TFP is rather small. A simulation experiment indicates that the effect on the annual TFP growth rate of an increase of the tax incentives from 10% to 15% (equivalent to a 5 cents increase in tax subsidy per dollar invested in R&D) would be 0.01 percentage points larger for an industry having the median R&D intensity than for an industry with the lowest level of R&D intensity. Again, this may be interpreted as a median effect if it is assumed that the effect of tax subsidies is close to zero in industries with very low R&D intensity. The effect of R&D incentives could potentially be larger in R&D intensive industries. Indeed, this increase in tax incentives is estimated to raise the average annual productivity growth rate by 0.09 percentage points more in an industry at the 75th percentile of the distribution of R&D intensity than in a sector at the 25th percentile of R&D intensity. This result should not be taken as necessarily supporting the use of R&D incentives to promote growth. This is because these incentives can cost considerable amounts of foregone revenue and, to achieve revenue-neutrality, would need to be compensated by tax increases elsewhere. One obvious source of compensating revenue would be from an increase in the corporate tax rate, but we have just seen that this would reduce TFP growth and investment. Unfortunately, the estimates presented here are not sufficiently precise to say whether or not increased R&D incentives financed by increased corporate tax rates would increase growth, and so no firm conclusion is possible from these results.
An alternative to using the main statutory corporate tax rate in the estimation of the effect of corporate taxes on TFP would have been to use effective corporate tax rates, which take account of the definition of the tax base as well as the tax rate. Effective tax rates are derived from theoretical investment models. Depending on the assumptions of the model the effective rates can refer to a marginal effective tax rate (METR) which is applied to incremental investment projects earning just their minimum required return or to an average effective tax rate (AETR) which is applied to discrete investment projects earning some economic rent.
To test the difference that this would make, empirical analysis was undertaken using data on the effective tax rates computed by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) based on the methodology of Devereux and Griffith (2003) . The focus is on two important elements of corporate tax codes:
the depreciation allowances and statutory corporate tax rates.
The empirical results using industry-level data on a panel of 12 OECD countries covering 21 industries over the 1981-2001 period suggest that the average effective corporate tax (AETR) has a negative effect on TFP. A simulation experiment indicates that the effect of a reduction of the effective tax rate from 35% to 30% on the average yearly TFP growth rate (over 10 years) would be 0.1 percentage points larger for an industry with the median profitability than for an industry with the lowest level of profitability. This is slightly larger than the results derived from the estimates reported in Table 6 .
Policy implications
The estimates presented in section 2 and 3 can be seen as some sort of average effect for the countries whose data are included. This means that they cannot be used directly to predict what will happen in any particular country. The tax policy changes that are most likely to increase growth in any country will depend on its starting point, in terms of both its current tax system and the areas (such as employment, investment or productivity growth) in which its current economic performance is relatively poor. In addition, the estimates are based on the relatively small tax policy changes that most OECD countries have undertaken and cannot be used to estimate the impact of larger changes. Nonetheless, the estimates do provide a basis for the serious consideration of a number of directions for tax reform.
In examining these directions, governments will need to take account of other factors apart from the growth of GDP. Issues of revenue sufficiency, equity, simplicity and compliance costs are just some examples of the factors that are often considered. Thus the suggestion that reducing corporate taxes can increase the level and, possibly, the rate of growth of GDP is not sufficient on its own to recommend the policy. It is not possible to discuss all the relevant policy concerns here but attention will be given to the key issue of equity.
Growth promoting tax policies
The results presented in section 2 suggest a "tax and growth ranking" with recurrent taxes on immovable property being the preferred tax instrument in terms of long-run GDP per capita, followed by consumption taxes (and other property taxes), personal income taxes and corporate income taxes. This ranking is consistent with earlier empirical results (e.g. Kneller et al, 1999) and is readily explained in theoretical terms (see Johansson et al, 2008 , for a more detailed discussion of the effects of each type of tax on growth):
Recurrent taxes on immovable property (especially residential property) are relatively good for growth because most OECD countries provide various tax preferences for owneroccupied housing (such as tax deductibility of interest on house loans and exemption from capital gains tax), which result in a misallocation of capital towards housing, away from other investments. In this situation, the pre-tax rate of return on housing investment is below the pre-tax rate of return on investment elsewhere in the economy. This implies that increasing recurrent taxes on immovable property will shift some investment out of housing into higher return investments and so increase the rate of growth.
Taxes on property transactions -another major form of property tax -also have the benefit of shifting investment out of housing into higher-return activities. However, they have the disadvantage of discouraging housing transactions and thus the reallocation of housing to its most productive use, thus reducing growth. Other property taxes -on financial transactions, inheritance and net wealth -can also distort the allocation of capital and/or the incentive to save. Thus, property taxes in general are likely to be more harmful to growth than recurrent taxes on immovable property.
Consumption taxes can affect labour supply by reducing the real value of wages but are otherwise seen as neutral. For example, they do not discourage savings and investment.
Also, they are normally applied on a destination basis -applied to imports and refunded/exempted on export -and so do not affect the behaviour of firms that produce internationally traded goods. They can distort the behaviour of firms producing non-traded goods if applied at non-uniform rates, but the spread of general consumption taxes, such as VAT, means that consumption taxes are more uniform now than they used to be in most OECD countries although reduced VAT rates are still common. Thus, consumption taxes can be expected to have little negative effect on growth, although they do not have the advantages of recurrent taxes on immovable property.
Personal income taxes are seen as more harmful to growth than consumption taxes for two reasons. First, they are generally progressive, with marginal tax rates (which discourage growth) that are higher than their average rates (which generate government revenues). This means that they discourage growth more per unit of tax revenue than consumption taxes, which are generally flat rate and not progressive. Second, they typically tax the return to savings (interest or dividends) in addition to taxing the income from which savings are made, thus discouraging savings. While this second effect may not harm the growth of publicly quoted companies that can raise funds overseas, it can reduce the growth financing for small and medium-sized companies. These negative effects on growth are illustrated by the results in section 3.1, relating to the effects of personal income tax on total factor productivity growth.
Finally, corporate income taxes can be expected to be the most harmful for growth as they discourage the activities of firms that are most important for growth: investment in capital and in productivity improvements. These effects are illustrated by the results presented in section 3.2. Also, in practice, complex corporate tax codes cause high tax compliance costs for firms and reduce FDI. In addition, most corporate tax system have a large number of provisions that provide tax advantages to specific activities, typically drawing resources away from the sectors in which they can make the greatest contribution to growth.
This "tax and growth ranking" means that growth could be increased, at least temporarily, without reducing tax revenue by a partial shift from income taxes to consumption and property taxes. Taxes on residential property are likely to be best for growth. However, few countries manage to raise substantial revenues from property taxes, with housing generally taxed more lightly than other assets. In practical policy terms, therefore, a greater revenue shift could probably be achieved into consumption taxes.
While recurrent taxes on immovable property are the best taxes to increase -from a growth point of view -corporate taxes appear to be the taxes that should be reduced most. However, lowering the corporate tax rate substantially below the top personal income tax rate can jeopardize the integrity of the tax system as high-income individuals will attempt to shelter their savings within corporations. This means that it often makes sense to think about reducing income taxes in a co-ordinated way.
Of course, changing the balance between different tax sources should not been seen as the only way in which tax structure can influence economic growth. Improving the design of individual taxes can also be important. For example, the results of section 3.1 suggest that flattening the personal income tax schedule could be beneficial for GDP per capita, notably by favouring entrepreneurship. Indeed, the reform of individual taxes can complement a revenue shift. For example, broadening the base of consumption taxes is a better way of increasing their revenues than rate increases, because a broad base improves efficiency while a high rate encourages the growth of the shadow economy. More generally, most taxes would benefit from a combination of base broadening and rate reduction.
Equity considerations
From a practical policy point of view, the main difficulty with these pro-growth tax policies is that they are likely to increase inequality. In most OECD countries, it is the personal income tax that accounts for almost all of the progressivity in the tax system. So, a move away from personal income tax towards consumption and property taxes, neither of which are seen as progressive, is very likely to increase inequality. This is particularly true if the personal income tax is reduced in the way suggested by the results in section 3.1: reducing the top marginal rate of income tax.
In addition, corporate tax is generally perceived as a tax on the rich, and so any move away from it would also be seen as regressive. However, there are two reasons why this perception may be too strong. First, in many countries, a large proportion of company shares are owned by pension funds, so after-tax profits go to benefit a fairly broad range of workers when they retire.
Second, to the extent that cuts in corporate taxes increase investment (as demonstrated in section 3.2), they will lead to an increase in demand for labour and thus result in an increase in the wage.
So, in principle, cuts in corporate taxes could benefit workers. Unfortunately, there is no clear consensus on the extent to which these two effects reduce the regressive nature of corporate tax cuts in practice.
A further difficulty is that both consumption taxes and recurrent taxes on residential immovable property are widely seen as inequitable. In the case of consumption taxes, the argument is based on the observation that poorer people spend a higher proportion of their income than richer people. But much low income observed at a point in time is temporary and need not reflect low lifetime living standards: while some people are persistently poor, many have volatile earnings. Over a lifetime, income and expenditure must be equal (apart from inheritances, which are generally small), and indeed annual expenditure is arguably better than annual income as a guide to lifetime living standards. If we were to look at the effect of taxes on lifetime income inequality, the contrast between "progressive" direct taxes and "regressive" indirect taxes would be much smaller. However, it would still be the case that personal income taxes are more progressive than consumption taxes.
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The case of recurrent taxes on residential property is more complex. There is no reason in principle why these taxes could not be mildly progressive, by applying a tax free allowance that would effectively exempt low-income housing. However, most countries have not done this and, in fact, some have property valuation systems that reduce the effective tax rate paid on expensive dwellings. In addition, many countries have not kept their property valuations up to date, with the result that some households are paying taxes that are wildly out of line with the present value of their home. If these faults were corrected, recurrent taxes on residential property would probably become less unpopular than they are currently, but one problem would remain: the tax is levied on some measure of the value of the property and thus may not reflect the owner"s ability to pay. The classic example is that of an elderly widow who is living in the house where she raised her children, which is now both too large for her and has a value that is out of proportion to her current income. Many countries have measures which attempt to ameliorate this problem, but it is still one that is raised in most countries when the level of property taxation is discussed.
Conclusions
This chapter has presented empirical analysis that suggests that growth can be increased, at least in the short-to-medium term, by shifting the balance of taxation away from income taxes and towards a mixture of consumption taxes and taxes on immovable property (particularly on residential property). This confirms the expectations of theoretical analysis and shows that tax structure -and not just the overall tax-to-GDP ratio -is an important element in promoting economic growth.
The chapter has also shown that it is not only the tax structure that matters. The design of individual taxes -such as the top marginal rate of income tax -can also be important to growth.
Indeed, improving the design of individual taxes will increase the benefit of shifting the tax mix away from income taxation.
The main drawback of these policies is that they are likely to lead to increased inequality, which implies that countries need to consider the trade-off between equity and growth carefully.
However, the trade-off could be made more favourable by improving the design and
